We examine the relationship between a candidate's gender and their electoral success, using data from all Federal elections to the Australian House of Representatives between 1903 and 2004. Controlling for party affiliation, incumbency, expected vote share and the number of candidates on the ballot, we find that the vote share of female candidates is 0.6 percentage points smaller than that of male candidates (for major parties, the gap widens to 1½ percentage points). In theory, differences in the electoral performance of male and female candidates could be explained by the preselection system. But using various strategies, we find little evidence that the preselection system is responsible for much of the gender voting gap. Over time, the gap between male and female candidates has shrunk considerably. This is most likely due to changes in social norms (as proxied by the gender pay gap) and the share of female candidates running nationwide. Across electorates, we find that female candidates are harmed, not helped, by having more women on the ballot. In addition, female candidates do not appear to benefit from running in electorates where a higher share of voters are female.
I. Introduction
In 1902, Australia gave women the right to vote in Federal elections. 1 To answer these questions, we examine the relationship between a candidate's gender and their electoral success, using data from Federal elections to the Australian House of Representatives between 1903 and 2004. We find that female candidates do fare worse than their male counterparts in Australian elections, although the gender voting gap has shrunk over time. One possible interpretation of our results is that they are merely driven by preselector bias. However, using various strategies to that allow us 1 This occurred through the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902. However, women in South Australia and Western Australia voted in the 1901 election. For a detailed history of the representation of women in Australian politics, see Sawer (2001) . 2 There are three major political parties in Australian politics. The main left-wing party is the Australian Labor Party, and the two right-wing parties are the city-based Liberal Party of Australia, and the rural National Party. The two right-wing parties operate in Coalition with one another, meaning that each agrees not to run candidates against a sitting member of the other party.
to look only at the effect of voter bias, we conclude that this is not the case (this is not to say that preselector bias is non-existent; but simply that it does not affect our estimates of voter bias). Over time, changes in the gender pay gap seem to be partly explained by social norms (as proxied by the gender pay gap) and the share of candidates who are female. Across electorates, women tend to perform better when there are fewer other women on the ballot paper, and do not benefit from running in electorates with more female voters.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents a review of the key literature. Section III then examines the political attitudes of male and female candidates, to see whether there appear to be systematic differences. Section IV turns to electoral data, analysing election results from all Australian federal elections.
Section V then addresses 'the preselection problem', by attempting to separate voter bias from preselector bias. Section VI analyses several factors that might explain trends in the gender voting gap over time and across electorates, and the final section concludes.
II. Existing Research on Candidate Gender and Voting
While little analysis on the relationship between gender and electoral outcomes has taken place in Australia, several US studies have sought to explain the lack of female elected representatives in terms of discriminatory voting behaviour by the public; a 'gender gap' in voting behaviour; or discriminatory practices by political parties themselves.
The first body of literature related to this study examines the possibility that voters display discriminatory voting behaviour based on candidate gender. A range of US studies (Darcy and Schramm, 1977; Ekstrand and Eckert, 1981; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993a; Berch, 2004) have experimented with 'changing' the gender of a particular candidate in order to determine the effect on voters' choice of candidate.
Each found that voters display no systematic bias for or against female candidates.
However, while Fox and Smith's (1998) experimental study also found that voters in California-a highly liberal state-did not display evidence of gender bias, a simultaneous experiment in Wyoming-a highly conservative US state-found that voters gave an additional 10 per cent of the vote to the male candidate. In the two Australian studies we are aware of, Kelley and McAllister (1983) In seeking to explain some of the bias against female candidates in the electorate, both Kenworthy and Malami (1999) and Kittilson (2006) suggest that society's attitudes towards women have a pervasive effect on their numbers in Parliament or Congress.
Both studies show that in Western industrialised nations, more egalitarian attitudes towards women, high levels of women in professional occupations, and an early history of women's suffrage are each associated with a higher percentage of women in elected political positions.
A second, related, body of literature finds that voters discriminate on the grounds of gender as they tend to view men and women as better suited to particular elected roles. That is, male candidates are more successful in elections to national or executive offices and those that require decision-making around the economy or defence, while female candidates fare better when running for 'nurturing' roles in local government or in 'feminine' policy areas such as education and child care (Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993b; Fox and Oxley, 2003; King and Matland, 2003) .
Similarly, Herrnson, Lay and Stokes (2003) find that when female candidates appeal to traditional gender stereotypes, focus on 'women's issues' or target female voters in their campaigns, they are 11 per cent more likely to be elected than when they run a 'gender-free' campaign. Yet regardless of voters' views about the relationship between gender and political suitability, McAllister and Studlar (1992) show that in Australia, a candidate's political party explains a far greater proportion of his or her political attitudes and behaviour than does the candidate's gender. The only exception is that female candidates across all Australian political parties tend to demonstrate a more progressive attitude towards women's equality than do male candidates.
The third body of literature does not deal with candidate gender, but rather examines the 'gender gap' in the behaviour of male and female voters. Female voters in the US place greater emphasis on the wellbeing of the national economy, social welfare and traditional liberal issues, while male voters display more conservative attitudes to military force and foreign policy, and tend to vote based on their personal economic wellbeing ('pocketbook' voting) (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Chaney et al., 1998) .
This apparent liberal-conservative split between women and men is not consistent with the Australian context, however. Australian women have traditionally supported the (right-wing) Coalition or Liberal Party, while Australian men have displayed a long-term preference for the (left-wing) ALP (Renfrow, 1994; Leithner, 1997) . More recently, this gender gap has closed, with male and female voters now equally likely to support the major political parties (Leigh 2005 (Leigh , 2006 .
Finally, many studies blame the political parties themselves for an internal bias against women in the candidate-selection process (Darcy and Schramm, 1977; Bean and McAllister, 1990; Caul, 2001; Conway, 2001; Kittilson, 2006) . Kelley and McAllister (1984) find that in Australia, female candidates face an electoral disadvantage of 10 per cent of vote share, of which 6 per cent is due to the failure of political parties to nominate women as candidates in the first place. Two studies (Darcy and Schramm, 1977; Caul, 2001) (Mackerras 1977) . Bean and McAllister (1990) show that in the 1990 Federal election, 56 per cent of female Liberal Party candidates were nominated for safe Labor seats, while 21 per cent of female ALP candidates ran for safe Liberal-National Party seats. However, in 1994, the ALP-the left-wing major party-adopted a quota to pre-select women in 35 per cent of winnable seats (Whip, 2003) . In 2001, the ALP National Conference increased this quota to 40 per cent.
As far as we are aware, ours is the first paper to study the effects of gender on electoral outcomes in Australia over the past century. We seek to extend the work of Kelley and McAllister (1984) and Bean and McAllister (1990) We choose the eight questions that are asked in all three surveys: taxation; immigration; education; the environment; industrial relations; health and Medicare; defence and national security; and unemployment. The second set of questions ask candidates whether they agree with the statements: "High income tax makes people less willing to work hard", "The trade unions in this country have too much power", "Big business in this country has too much power", "Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary working people", and "There should be stricter laws to regulate the activities of trade unions".
To test for gender effects, we show four specifications: (1) just election fixed effects, In most cases, these effects are not only statistically significant, but also large.
Controlling for demographic and party differences, female candidates are one-third more likely to rate health as the top priority, and one-third less likely to rate taxation as their top priority. In all cases, the female-male difference and the Labor-Liberal differences have the same sign, although the female-male differences are typically smaller. brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Mean probabilities add to 119%, since some candidates nominated more than one issue as their top priority. N=1090. Table 2 shows a similar analysis for a set of attitudinal questions. Without party and demographic controls, the gender differences are significant for all five questions.
Female candidates are less likely than male candidates to believe that high taxes deter work, that trade unions have too much power, or that unions need to be more strictly regulated, while female candidates are more likely to believe that big business has too much power and that there should be greater redistribution of income and wealth.
Including party fixed effects and demographics, these last two effects cease to be statistically significant.
Again, the gender gaps are substantively large. Even controlling for party fixed effects and demographics, female candidates are one-third less likely to believe that taxes deter work, one-quarter less likely to believe that trade unions have too much power, and one-tenth more likely to believe that big business has too much power. In all these cases, the female-male difference and the Labor-Liberal differences have the same sign, with the female-male gap being around up to one-third of the LaborLiberal gap. (Note that the Labor-Liberal gaps are larger than in Table 1 , since the questions in Table 2 go to the heart of the difference between the parties.) Together, the results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the gender of a candidate provides a strong signal as to that person's attitudes. Relative to male candidates of the same party, female candidates are more concerned about education and health, less concerned about taxation, immigration, defence and unemployment, less worried about union power, and more worried about big business. To the extent that the results of election surveys in the late-1990s and early-2000s can be extrapolated to earlier periods, it suggests that knowing a candidate's gender allows a voter to predict much about his or her attitudes (though it has less predictive power than knowing the candidate's political party). As a simple rule of thumb for voters, Liberal Party women and Labor Party men are likely to be more centrist, while Liberal Party men and Labor Party women are likely to tend towards more ideologically extreme positions.
IV. How do Female Candidates Fare in Australian Elections?
We now turn to the centerpiece of our study -an analysis using data from all 40
Federal elections to the Australian House of Representatives conducted between 1903 and 2004 (as we explain below, we use the 1901 election to calculate an expected vote share measure, so observations from 1901 appear in Figures 1 and 2 , but not the regression analysis and subsequent graphs). So far as we are aware, our paper is the first to use data on every individual electoral race since Federation. This is most likely because the data has not previously been available in a comparable electronic form. In our case, we have benefited from electronic spreadsheets provided to us by Robert Pugh of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). Although these saved us the burden of manually entering the data, we nonetheless spent a considerable amount of time reformatting the data in a consistent manner. Additionally, since the AEC spreadsheets did not always include information on the incumbent candidate, we merged in data on incumbency using records available at Adam Carr's election website. incumbents rather than winners, since it directly pertains to the regression analysis that follows). We also note on the graph some important milestones for women in Australian politics.
A surprising fact about these data is that prior to 1970, only three women were elected to federal parliament: Enid Lyons, Doris Blackburn, and Kay Brownbill. Perhaps more striking is the fact that despite social changes that took place during the 1970s, only one woman (Joan Child) was elected to parliament in this period. This is consistent with data from the upper echelons of the federal public service (the Senior Executive Service), where the share of women rose more rapidly in the 1980s than the 1970s (ABS 1997 Figure 2: Share of incumbents who were women
Our formal analysis involves estimating regressions that take the form:
In this regression, the dependent variable is the share of the first-preference vote received by candidate i, representing party j, in electorate k, and election t. This variable, which we term Voteshare, ranges from 0 to 1. Throughout this paper, our dependent variable is a candidate's share of the primary vote. 4 The variable
FemaleCandidate is an indicator variable, taking the value 0 for male candidates, and 1 for female candidates.
Z is a vector of candidate-specific, party-specific and election-specific characteristics, which we include because they may be correlated with both Voteshare and
FemaleCandidate. The more candidates that run in a given race, the fewer votes each will be likely to garner. To account for this effect, all our regressions control for the reciprocal of the number of candidates standing in that particular electorate in a given year. Because incumbency may confer electoral benefits, all regressions also control for whether the candidate was the incumbent (ie. whether he or she won that seat at the previous election, or in a by-election). In some instances, politicians win election in one electorate and run in a different electorate at the next election. We code these as non-incumbents.
A number of studies of women in politics have referred to the 'sacrificial lamb hypothesis'; the notion that political parties choose women to run for unwinnable seats, but put forth men as candidates when the party has a reasonable chance of winning the seat (see eg. Berch 2004 Table 3 presents the results of these specifications. In the absence of election and party fixed effects, the FemaleCandidate coefficient is very small (0.001) and statistically insignificant. However, once we add election and party fixed effects (column 2) or election×party fixed effects (column 3), the coefficient rises to around two-thirds of a percentage point, and is significant at the 1 percent level. The fact that the results without fixed effects are insignificant is itself curious, and suggests election-specific and party-specific factors that are correlated with the success of female candidates (indeed, the results in column 2 are largely unchanged if we include only election fixed effects, or only party fixed effects).
In our preferred specification (column 3), we estimate that being female reduces a candidate's primary vote share by 0.6 percentage points. One can glean some sense of the magnitude of this effect from the fact that the benefit of being male is about twothirds as large as the benefit of drawing the top spot on the ballot paper (King and
Leigh 2007). Another potentially useful comparison is to note that in recent
Australian elections, around 4 percent of seats have been decided by a margin of 0.6 percent or less. Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
V. The Preselection Problem
Although we find evidence of a bias against female candidates in Australia, it is possible that part (or all) of this bias could be due to preselectors, rather than voters.
As Kelley and McAllister (1983) have suggested, the pre-selection process used by the major political parties in Australia may be a source of disadvantage for female candidates. Indeed, in Appendix II, we explore the issue using the 1987 and 1990
Australian Candidate Studies, and find some suggestive evidence of preselector bias in those elections (though it is quite possible that this estimate does not generalise to the other elections in our sample).
Our concern here is not with estimating the relative size of preselector bias and voter bias, but rather with a more subtle question: to what extent are our estimates of voter bias merely a reflection of preselector bias? Note that the effect of preselector bias on estimates of voter bias is a conceptually distinct issue from the size of preselector bias. Whether or not preselector bias muddies our attempt to estimate voter bias does not directly depend on whether preselector bias is larger or small.
How might we address the possibility of preselector bias when using election data?
Here, we adopt two strategies that help us to determine whether or not party-based discrimination is driving our results. First, we restrict the sample to incumbents, and compare female incumbents with male incumbents. Incumbents, unlike their challengers, do not typically face a hotly contested preselection process in order to become a party's candidate. In effect, we hypothesize that if the voter bias differs between incumbents and challengers, then party bias is likely to be affecting estimates of the gender voting bias. This strategy follows Milyo and Schosberg (2000) , who find that when the sample is restricted to US incumbents (and controlling for challenger quality), female incumbents outperform male incumbents (see also Berch
2004).
Second, we restrict the sample to independent candidates, and compare female and male candidates who run as independents. By definition, independent candidates do not have to face preselection, so this strategy provides an alternative way of estimating voter bias in a way that is uncontaminated by preselector behaviour. Table 4 shows the results from these two approaches. In both cases, we use our preferred specification (Table 3 , Column 3), which includes election×party fixed effects. In the case of incumbents, we find that female incumbents are penalised by a loss of 1.8 percentage points at the ballot box (column 1), while non-incumbent females receive 1.1 percentage point fewer votes (column 2). These effects are both larger than those shown in Table 3 , since the sample in columns 1 and 2 is restricted to major-party candidates. A formal test cannot reject the hypothesis that the two FemaleCandidate coefficients are the same.
The results in columns 3 and 4 bear out this conclusion. Separating the sample into independent candidates and those who ran with the support of a political party, we again find no difference between the two. Since independents do not have to face a preselection, this again suggests that our estimates of voter bias are not affected to any large extent by preselector behaviour. Unfortunately, both of the strategies employed in Table 4 have their limitations.
While incumbents are often re-selected without a contested preselection, their initial selection is often hotly contested. As a result, it is plausible that male and female major party incumbents may nonetheless differ on some important dimension. And in the case of independent candidates, it is plausible that the typical voter with a propensity to vote independent has a different gender bias than other voters in the electorate. Nonetheless, our results would be unlikely to look as they do in Table 4 House of Representatives members were women. If we regard this as an exogenous shock to the preselection system, it can help to shed light on the extent to which preselector bias affects our estimates of voter bias.
To test this theory, we compare the performance of female candidates standing for the Labor Party before and after the 35 percent rule took effect. In order that our results are identified only from the rule change, we include three sets of fixed effects:
• election×party fixed effects, which absorb party-specific swings from election to election; • female×party fixed effects, which allow voters to provide a differential level of support to female and male candidates from each party; and • female×election fixed effects, which allow the average degree of support for female candidates to change from one election to the next.
Our results are therefore identified from the triple-difference interaction FemaleCandidate×ALP×Post, which denotes female candidates who ran for the Labor Party after the rule took effect. We present two specifications: one in which the post-period denotes the years after 1994 (when the rule change began to affect preselections), and one in which the post-period denotes the years after 2001 (when the 35 percent rule change was operative). Table 5 presents results from these specifications. In both cases, the coefficient on the triple difference term is close to zero and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the new policy -which substantially increased the share of female candidates -did not affect the gender voting gap for ALP candidates. This provides further support for the notion that the preselection process is not driving our estimates of voter bias.
(Again, it is important to stress that we are not measuring preselector bias; instead we are checking whether preselector bias affects our estimates of voter bias.) 
VI. What Explains the Gender Voting Gap?
In this section, we analyse the factors that might explain differences in the gender voting gap between electorates and over time. To give some sense of the patterns that we are trying to account for, we estimated the gender voting gap separately for each election, by interacting it with a dummy for that election. Note that such an interaction can either be done by including the main effect (FemaleCandidate) and omitting one of the election interactions, or by omitting the main effect, and including all election interactions. We opt here for the latter. Since our specification also includes election×party fixed effects, it is unnecessary to also include election fixed effects. Figure 3 plots the beta coefficients from regression (2), along with their associated standard errors. As can be seen, the degree of gender bias against female candidates has fallen substantially since the early part of the twentieth century. We estimate the gender bias against female candidates (of the same party, running in the same election, and controlling for incumbency and expected vote share) to have been over 10 percent until the 1920s, and then to be between 5 and 10 percent until the 1940s. In the postwar decades, the gap fell below 5 percent, where it has remained since. Another plausible explanation is that the gender voting gap is driven by social norms.
As noted above, a series of studies in Western Europe and the United States have found that women are more likely to be elected to political positions in countries or states that hold more egalitarian attitudes towards gender equality. One way of gauging social norms is by looking at labour market differences between men and women. To test this, we obtain annual data on the gender pay gap from the Australian Bureau of Statistics' average weekly earnings survey (covering the period since 1970), and splice this to data from Snooks (1994 Snooks ( ) (covering 1901 . Note that both 8 Perhaps the best example of this theory were the 1996 and 1998 federal elections, each of which saw 15 women newly elected to the House of Representatives.
series relate to full-time non-managerial employees, but that the gender gap is not adjusted to account for age, experience, education, or industry.
In Figure 5 , we chart the gender pay gap against our estimate of the ballot box penalty against women. In 1903, the gender pay gap was 67 percent (meaning that the typical woman earned 33 percent of the typical man). By 1960, the gap had narrowed to around 40 percent. Following the equal pay decisions of 1969, 1972, and 1974 , the gap shrunk to around 30 percent, and is 18 percent in 2004. In general, the shrinking of the gender pay gap appears to track the ballot box penalty against women quite well, with both gaps shrinking markedly the first part of the twentieth century, and (at a much slower rate) during the 1980s and 1990s. The only point at which the two series do not seem to track closely is the late-1960s and early-1970s. This may reflect the fact that the substantial reduction in the gender pay penalty in this period was driven by legislative changes rather than social attitudes. Since we are using the gender pay gap as a proxy for social attitudes towards women, it may be a poor proxy of attitudes in these years. One way of obtaining data on this question would be via exit polls, which asked male and female voters which candidate they voted for. Unfortunately, large scale exit polling data is not available in Australia. Instead, the closest information we have is from the Australian Election Study, a mail-out survey conducted after the election.
Although the AES asks about voting behaviour, voters are asked about which party they voted for, rather than which candidate. While the AES is therefore very useful for analysing partisan voting patterns, it is therefore likely that any candidate-specific factors are poorly measured in the AES.
To look at the behaviour of male and female voters, we therefore adopt a different approach, exploiting the fact that for elections between 1903 and 1966, the Australian
Electoral Commission recorded the number of men and women who voted in each electorate. This figure ranged between 17 and 60 percent for all elections, and between 36 and 59 percent for elections in which at least one female candidate was on the ballot. In Figure 6 , we plot the relationship between the share of voters who were female and the share of the vote received by the female candidate. Somewhat to our surprise, we observe no strong pattern between the two. Indeed, to the extent that there is a relationship, it appears to be negative, as indicated by the fitted line. We turn now to a more formal analysis of the three gender voting hypotheses, in which we augment equation (1) by adding an interaction between the possible explanator and whether the candidate is female. We begin by focusing on the three variables that change over time: the share of incumbents who are female, the share of candidates who are female, and the gender earnings penalty.
9 Since the specifications already include election×party fixed effects, these capture the main effects of the three variables, so we need only include the interactions. Note: Standard errors, clustered at the election×electorate level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Note that the share of incumbents who are female, the share of candidates who are female, and the gender pay gap only vary at the election level, so the main effects of these variables are captured by the election×party fixed effects.
While the three variables in Table 6 only vary from election to election, it is also possible to exploit variation across electorates in the same election. Two of our explanatory factors -the share of candidates in a particular electorate who are female (excluding the individual), and the share of voters in an electorate who are femalevary within elections. This therefore allows us to estimate models in which we include both election×party fixed effects, and election×female fixed effects. We can then ask the question -controlling for the average gender voting gap in a particular election, why are some electorates more favourable towards women than others? Table 7 shows the results from this specification. When we interact the female coefficient with the share of other candidates in the same race who are female, the coefficient is -0.018, which is significant at the 1 percent level. Since the typical race has four candidates, and the share variables exclude the individual, this suggests that a woman running against three men receives 0.6 percent more of the vote (0.018×0.33) than a woman running against two men and another woman.
In column 2, we explore whether female candidates do better in electorates with a larger share of female voters (restricting the sample to With this caveat in mind, we find only a weak relationship between the share of voters who are female and the performance of female candidates. The coefficient in column 2 is substantively large (suggesting that a 10 percent increase in the share of female voters leads to a 3 percentage point drop in the vote share of female candidates), but is significant only at the 10 percent level.
In column 4, we include both the candidate composition interaction and the voter composition interaction. Including both has little effect on the point estimates (for voter composition, compare columns 3 and 4, which both use data from 1903-66), but neither is statistically significant. We therefore conclude that the gender composition of other candidates matters (using the full sample), but that the gender composition of voters does not have a significant effect. 
VII. Conclusion
Although women make up a majority of the Australian population (50.3 percent), they are still substantially underrepresented in the Australian parliament. Using data on elections since 1903, we show that this is partly due to a systematic penalty towards female candidates at the ballot box. Our regression analysis takes account of party affiliation, incumbency, expected vote share and the number of candidates running in that election. We find that female candidates faced a penalty at the ballot box of at least 5 percentage points until World War II, a couple of percentage points in the immediate postwar decades, and less than 1 percentage point in the 1990s and early2000s. On average, female candidates received 0.6 percentage points fewer votes than male candidates. The effect was larger for female candidates representing major parties, who received 1-2 percentage points less. We find no evidence of any consistent benefit to female candidates at the Australian ballot box.
In theory, differences in the electoral performance of male and female candidates could be explained solely by biases in the preselection system. However, we do not find evidence that the preselection system has had much of an effect on the gender voting gap. Three pieces of evidence support this. First, the gender voting gap in major parties is similar among incumbents and challengers. Second, independents (who do not face preselection), have a similar gender voting gap as non-independents.
And third, a substantial increase in the share of women preselected by the Labor Party did not appear to affect the electoral performance of female Labor candidates.
What explains the gender voting gap? In part, we find that voters use a candidate's gender to predict much about his or her political attitudes, and thus display their political preferences (and gender bias) by selecting candidates along gender, as well as party, lines. Furthermore, we find evidence that, over time, social norms (as proxied by the gender pay gap) have an effect on the gender voting gap. We also find that a higher share of female candidates running nationwide in a given election boosts the chances of a given female candidate winning. Controlling for these factors, a larger share of female incumbents has a negative effect on the gender voting gap, but the magnitude of this effect is smaller than the magnitude of the candidate coefficient.
A 10 percentage point increase in both the share of female incumbents and the share of female candidates shrinks the voting gap by 0.4 percentage points.
Finally, our analysis permits us to compare outcomes for female candidates running in different electorates in the same election. We find that female candidates are harmed, not helped, by having more women on the ballot paper. In addition, the share of voters who are women does not appear to have a positive impact on the performance of female candidates. Although our data are at an aggregate level, they are consistent with the theory that female voters are not more likely to support female candidates. 
